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1Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore, 2 School of Psychology, University of
Birmingham, Edgbaston, UK
The rules of soccer dictate that play, once halted, cannot continue if a player is injured.
Players may take advantage of this rule by feigning injury to preserve beneficial match
positions. Thirty Euro 2008 matches, 90 Premier League matches and 63 World Cup
2010 matches were reviewed for the timing and severity of injuries. The number of
injuries was compared between teams that benefited from stopping the game and
those that did not benefit. The number of low-level injuries, not resulting in substitution
or subsequent problems, was directly compared for Benefit and Non-Benefit teams
for each 15-min period following kick off. Statistical significance was assessed using
appropriate non-parametric tests. In addition, seven current players and three managers
were interviewed and were asked about feigning injury. Teams that benefited from
game stoppages suffered significantly more minor injuries in the last 15 min of matches
compared with those that did not benefit. Four of the players directly admitted feigning
injury. When it is beneficial, soccer players can and do successfully feign injury to stop the
game. Consequently it is possible that others might also successfully feign injury, pain or
disease when motivated to do so.
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INTRODUCTION
Soccer is the most widely viewed and followed sport in the world. In 2009, the final of the European
Champions League (Manchester United vs. Barcelona) attracted a total audience of 209 million
viewers. The 2009 NFL Super Bowl (Pittsburgh Steelers vs. Arizona Cardinals), in contrast attracted
a total audience of 162 million viewers (ViewerTrack, 2001)1. The 2010 FIFA World Cup Final
(Spain vs. The Netherlands) attracted a total audience of 620 million people (Kantarsport, 2011)2
and each of the 2008 Euro Championship matches attracted a minimum audience of 155 million
viewers (UEFA, 2008)3.
1ViewerTrack (2010). http://www.influencia.net/data/document/viewertrack-2010.pdf [accessed Nov 26, 2015].
2KantarSport (2011). http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/tv/01/47/32/73/2010fifaworldcupsouthafricatvaudi
encereport.pdf [accessed Nov 26, 2015].
3UEFA Euro 2008 Review (2008). http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/MediaRelease/Competitions/
MediaServices/73/54/28/735428_DOWNLOAD.pdf [accessed Nov 26, 2015].
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Accordingly, soccer generates enormous financial revenue
and losing games can result in severe financial penalties. The
failure of Manchester United to reach the knockout stages
of the European Champions League in 2011, for example,
was estimated to have cost the club more than £20 million
in lost TV revenue and gate receipts (Dirs, 2011). The huge
incentives to win games may encourage negative tactics such
as feigning injury at the end of the game to run down the
clock and maintain a winning position (Birdthistle, 2007).
During World Cup 2006, “severe injury” delayed several
games but the “severely injured” player requested a return
to play just seconds after having left the pitch (Birdthistle,
2007).
Previous studies have examined the attitudes of youth
soccer players using questionnaires and hypothetical scenarios
describing likely in-play events including faking an injury
(Kavussanu and Roberts, 2001; Ommundsen et al., 2003;
Kavussanu, 2006, 2008). Although the reported frequency
of negative behavior in youth soccer is low overall, studies
do demonstrate that players report faking injury in order
to gain an advantage. Moreover, negative behaviors increase
when the motivational climate includes strong pressure
to win, public recognition of ability and involvement
in competitions (Ommundsen et al., 2003; Miller et al.,
2005). All of these factors are likely to be engaged when
professional soccer players are involved in high-pressure
games.
Numerous previous studies have examined youth soccer
but far fewer have considered the attitudes or behavior of
professional soccer players (Hawkins and Fuller, 1999; Peterson
et al., 2000; Birdthistle, 2007). The combination of pressures
on professional soccer players, including pressure to win,
public exposure and high-stakes competition, are unlikely to
be precisely replicated in youth tournaments. These pressures
lead to the prediction that professional players will change
their behavior in a negative direction when a clear advantage
emerges. One such situation includes the final minutes of
a game where one team holds a favorable, but vulnerable,
score. Under those circumstances, players who feign injury,
slowing the game and potentially reducing the time for play,
increase the potential for maintaining their team’s favorable
score.
Consequently, the current study examines the behavior of
professional soccer players during three major tournaments—
the English Premier League (EPL), the World Cup and
the European Championships—and also includes interviews
with professional players and managers from the EPL. The
central aim is to assess whether players show evidence of
feigning or exaggerating injury at the end of games where
they have a favorable score. In the situation where one team
is in front, or is drawing against a team expected to win,
it is predicted that the frequency of injuries will increase
for players from the team in the more favorable position.
Similarly it is expected that players and managers might agree
that such situations occur, and that feigning or exaggerating
injury to run down the clock is an accepted strategy in
professional soccer.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Matches and Participants
Thirty Euro 2008 soccer matches, 90 EPL matches and 63 World
Cup 2010 matches were included. Thirty of the Premier League
matches took place 20–30 December 2008 and the remaining 60
took place between August 2011–February 2012. During the last
half of 2012, 15 current EPL players and seven managers were
approached and asked if they would take part in an interview
regarding match influences that may affect player behavior.
Seven players and three managers provided written consent and
were subsequently interviewed by one of the investigators (IA).
All interview procedures were reviewed and approved by the
University of Birmingham Central Ethics Committee.
Procedure: Match Observation
All matches were recorded and individual matches viewed in
a single sitting. Separate observers watched the Euro 2008/EPL
2008 matches and the World Cup competition (RB) and the
EPL 2011/12 (IA) matches. Notes on the goals and injuries were
recorded on a grid to indicate the time of the goal or injury,
the team that scored or sustained the injury and the nature and
severity of the injury.
Injuries that caused the game to be stopped were recorded
and were classified as High, Medium or Low severity similar to
previous research (Hawkins and Fuller, 1999). A High-severity
injury was defined as any injury that caused the player to be
substituted and subsequently miss at least 2 weeks of future
training and matches. A Medium-severity injury was defined as
any injury that caused the player to be substituted or caused
the player to miss up to 2 weeks of training and subsequent
matches. A Low-severity injury was defined as any injury that
stopped play but did not result in the player being substituted
or subsequently missing any training or matches. Low-severity
injuries were expected to increase toward the end of a game
for teams that could benefit from a delay in play and thus were
entered into further analysis.
For analysis, the games were divided into 15-min periods:
0–15thmin, 16–30thmin, 31–45thmin (including first-half
stoppage time), 46–60thmin, 61–75thmin and 76–90thmin
(including second-half stoppage time). Mann Whitney U-tests
were used throughout to assess differences in Low-severity injury
rates for teams with and without a benefit for creating a delay
in play. Mann Whitney was used because the data are non-
parametric frequency data, which violate the assumptions for
parametric analysis. For each game, low-level injuries were
counted for each 15-min division and the number of injuries
compared between benefit groups against the null-hypothesis of
no difference. As six comparisons were performed, the critical
p-value was set at p < 0.008 (p < 0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons). All comparisons were performed in SPSS using
the Mann Whitney U-test legacy procedure, which is robust to
violations of normalcy and equal distributions.
Benefit was primarily decided based on the current score
(winning teams were always assigned as the Benefit team). In the
event of the teams being level (as they always were at the start of
any game) the Benefit team was assessed based on current league
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position or relative world rankings and on the relative benefit of
a draw to each team and in-play factors such as player dismissals.
For example, if Manchester United (a top EPL team) were playing
Stoke City (amiddle ranking EPL team) atManchester then Stoke
City will benefit more from a draw. Thus, Stoke City will begin
the game as the Benefit team. Changes in the match situation
in any 15 min period (for example, a goal or player dismissal)
could cause the “Benefit team” to become the “Non-Benefit
team” and vice versa. In those situations, any future injuries were
interpreted accordingly. For example, if Manchester United were
leading 1-0 with 15min left and suffered an injury in the 77thmin
that injury was recorded as a “Benefit” injury. If Stoke City then
equalized in the 85thmin and Stoke City suffered an injury in the
89thmin, that injury was also recorded as a “Benefit” injury.
In all competitions, there were some matches in which there
was no obvious benefit to either team in stopping the game in the
final 15 min. Because the hypothesis pertains directly to the final
15min of the match, these matches were designated as “Dead.”
Dead matches included matches where the result would have no
bearing on qualification due to previous results. This happened
in the cup competitions where teams who had already qualified
played teams that were already eliminated in the final group
matches. Dead matches also included matches where one team
was leading by at least three goals in the final 15 min. Although
it is not impossible to overcome a three goal lead in the last 15
min of a match, such an outcome is highly unlikely and so the
incentive for the Benefit team to delay play drops considerably
for those games. Five matches from Euro 2008, five matches from
the EPL 2008, 23 matches fromWorld Cup 2010 and 16 matches
from the EPL 2011-12 were judged to be Dead matches and were
discarded for analysis.
Procedure: Interviews
Current EPL players and managers were first contacted through
an agent to ask if they were willing to take part. Those who
agreed were then directly contacted and a time arranged for
the interview. All players and managers who were interviewed
provided informed consent for their comments to be used in
subsequent publication. Interviews took place face-to-face with
the exception of one interview that took place over the phone. A
further interview also required the presence of a translator. The
experimenter recorded the interviews and later transcribed them
at her own pace.
Interviewees were informed that the aim of the interview
was to assess influences on player performance under real
match circumstances. All interviewees were naïve to the research
question. Accordingly, the following questions were asked of the
seven players:
1. Do you feel that the referee is easily influenced by players?
2. Do you feel that the referee is easily influenced by home
support/away jeering?
3. Do you feel a difference in play in yourself and your teammates
if you play in a competition?
4. Do you feel a difference in play in yourself and your teammates
at the beginning/end of the season?
5. Does the weather affect how you play?
6. Does the score-line affect how you play?
7. Does the time of game affect how you play?
8. What makes you respond more aggressively?
9. Do you have any strategies to “kill the clock” near the end of the
first half/game? E.g., run the ball into the corner; pass the ball
around more.
10. Do injuries hurt more/are worse at different points of the game?
(E.g., as a result of fatigue)
11. Do you find that opposition players feign injury in order to win
a free kick?
12. If so, does this usually depend on if they are in a winning
position? Does this usually depend on the time of play?
13. Have you ever found yourself to play up an injury as worse that
it is or go down easily in order to win a free kick or penalty? 14.
If so, were you in a winning position? What time of the game
was it?
And the following questions were asked of the three managers:
1. Do you feel that the referee is easily influenced by players?
2. Do you feel that the referee is easily influenced by home
support/away jeering?
3. Do you feel that the referee is easily influenced by managers?
4. Do you instruct your players to play differently/motivate them
in a different way in cup competitions?
5. Do you instruct your players to play differently/motivate them
in a different way at the beginning and end of the season?
6. In what way does the score-line affect your tactics if the team you
have out is playing at their best (but not necessarily winning)?
7. Does the time of game affect your tactics?
8. When would you expect your players to respond more
aggressively?
9. Do you have any strategies to instruct your team to “kill the
clock” near the end of the first half/game? E.g., run the ball into
the corner; pass the ball around more.
10. Do you find that opposition players feign injury in order to win
a free kick?
11. 11. If so, does this usually depend on if they are in a winning
position? Does this usually depend on the time of play?
12. Would you/have you ever instructed your players to play up an
injury as worse than it is or to go down easily/stay on the ground
for longer, in order to win a free kick or penalty?
13. If so, were you in a winning position? What time of the game
was it?
After completion of the interview, all interviewees were informed
of the hypothesis of the study and were reminded that they could
withdraw any or all of their comments if they wished. No one
requested withdrawal or modified their comments.
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the mean injuries for the Benefit and Non-
Benefit teams for each 15-min period. The differences were not
significant in the first half (all p-thresholds are two tailed): 0–
15min (U = 8970, p = 0.70), 16–30 min (U = 9089, p = 0.90)
and 31–45min periods (U = 8377, p = 0.17). Differences were
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FIGURE 1 | Distribution of Low-severity injuries for teams that could benefit from slowing the game (Benefit) and teams that could not benefit
(Non-Benefit). Error bars show standard errors.
also not significant for the first period of the second half: 46–
60min period (U = 8976, p = 0.73) but the final two periods
resulted in significantly more injuries for the “Benefit” team: 61–
75min (U = 7825, p = 0.01) and 76–9min periods (U = 6518,
p < 0.001, significant at p < 0.008). Cohen’s d = 0.64 for the
differences between Benefit and Non-Benefit teams in the final
15min, which is an effect size in the upper range of medium.
The critical interview questions for the players were questions
11–14 and for the managers questions 10–13. These questions
related to the central hypothesis concerning feigning injury
and the answers are summarized in Table 1. Four of the seven
players admitted actively “playing up” an injury to gain an
advantage and six of the seven players suggested that opposition
players feign injury. None of the three managers admitted to
actively instructing their players to feign injury but all were
somewhat ambivalent in their condemnation of such behavior.
One described it as “clever,” another admitted that players
did it, “to take the steam out of the game” and the third
admitted they might tell a player to stay down, “and take a
breather.”
DISCUSSION
This study used the naturally occurring, internal dynamics,
of high-pressure soccer matches to predict an increase in the
negative tactic of feigning or exaggerating injury toward the
end of a game. The results of the study precisely support the
prediction. During the first half of the observed matches, Low-
severity injuries sustained by teams approaching amore favorable
match outcome (Benefit teams) and by teams approaching
a less favorable outcome (Non-Benefit teams) do not differ.
During the second half of the observed matches, however, Low-
severity injuries gradually increase for the Benefit team and
gradually decrease for the Non-Benefit team. This difference
in injury frequency reaches significance for the final 15-min
game period. This pattern of results is exactly what would
be predicted if a desire to slow the game down to gain an
advantage from a delay in play drives Low-severity injuries.
When asked directly, a majority of players agreed that they
would feign injury to gain an advantage in a match, with several
spontaneously associating the feigning of injury with slowing
the game to maintain an advantageous position. Although no
manager stated that they directly encouraged such behavior, with
two categorically denying it, all admitted that they see the tactic
used and understood why it is used. One manager specifically
referred to it as “clever.”
Previous studies have also demonstrated that injuries in
competitive soccer games tend to increase toward the end of
each half (Hawkins and Fuller, 1999; Peterson et al., 2000). This
may indicate that fatigue increases injuries late in a game. It is
possible that fatigue varies with the Benefit andNon-Benefit team
such that the Benefit team plays harder and is therefore more
fatigued. While that is possible, we see it as unlikely. The critical
games in this study were exactly those games where both sides
had the potential for an improved outcome, and so both sides are
expected to play at a high level of intensity. Nevertheless, fatigue
was not directly addressed in the current study and is something
that can be considered in the future.
Similarly, it is possible that some of the increase in injuries
in the final part of the match is due to the extra time added
at the end of the match. Soccer referees will add the time lost
because of delays in play (due to injuries, substitutions and goals)
to the end of each half and the average duration of stoppage-time
added is 0.79min in the first half and 2.93 min in the second half
(Garicano et al., 2005). Consequently the final 15-min segment
included in Figure 1 is always more than 15-min, which will
inflate the number of injuries for that time period. Any inflation,
however, should be the same for both Benefit and Non-Benefit
teams and so the extra time cannot explain the discrepancy
between the two teams.
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TABLE 1 | Summarizes the answers to the final critical questions.
Question Answers
Do you find that opposition players feign injury in order to win a free kick?
(Players)
Do you find that opposition players feign injury in order to win a free kick?
(Managers)
Yes. Every player. (P1)
Players go down easily and win a free kick. (P2)
Yer [yes], it happens in football... when I’ve trained with foreign teams, I have been
asked why I didn’t fake injury. (P3)
A little bit... Players do do it. (P4)
Yer [yes], 100% yer [yes]. (P5)
There’s a lot of speculation about diving and winning a cheap free kick but I don’t
think so. (P6)
Yer [yes]. You get that all the time. (P7)
Yes. When they are leading and away from home, they use every trick to waste
time. (M1)
Yer [yes]. More and more so now. (M2)
It does happen. (M3)
If so, does this usually depend on if they are in a winning position? Does this
usually depend on the time of play? (Players)
If so, does this usually depend on if they are in a winning position? Does this
usually depend on the time of play? (Managers)
It’s whenever. (P2)
Mainly when you’re trying to get free kick or penalty. (P3)
Yer [yes], if result is going for them... Last 10/15 min if losing, unlikely to feign an
injury. (P4)
Sometimes. (P5)
Yes, definitely if they’re winning and it’s toward the end of the game to waste time. (P7)
Doing it for a reason. To waste time... Good tactic to take steam out of the game. (M2)
No. You see it from the first minute. (M3)
Have you ever found yourself to play up an injury as worse that it is or go down
easily in order to win a free kick or penalty? (Players)
Would you/have you ever instructed your players to play up an injury as worse
than it is or to go down easily/stay on the ground for longer, in order to win a free
kick or penalty? (Managers)
Yes, definitely. (P1)
No. (P2)
No, that’s not me. (P3)
I think sometimes you probably go down easier than you probably need do. (P4)
Yer [yes]. (P5)
No. Never and I will never do it. (P6)
Yes. (P7)
I don’t instruct, but it’s still clever. It depends on the importance of the game. (M1)
No. Never instructed... Only time I did it was to take steam out of the game. (M2)
I’m not saying experienced players in my team won’t do it. Sometimes they go down
and we need a breather and I might say, ok—you stay down there and take a
breather. But I wouldn’t suggest it before. (M3)
If so, were you in a winning position? What time of the game was it? (Players) Yes, only at the end of a game. (P1)
Sometimes. Just depends really. (P5)
Yes, I was in a winning position. (P7)
P, Players; M, Managers. There were no manager answers for the final question.
Only one observer watched the matches, which creates
the possibility of bias and denies us the opportunity
to assess inter-rater reliability. Nevertheless, different
observers watched different tournaments and the effects
were consistent throughout. Observers were also not blind
to the hypotheses or to which was the Benefit and Non-
Benefit team. Future studies might consider using more than
one observer and involving observers who are blind to the
study aims.
We infer that the discrepancy between Benefit and Non-
Benefit teams in the final 15 min is due, at least in part, to
players feigning pain and injury when there is a benefit to
slowing the game. By going to ground, a player encourages
the referee to give a foul or stop the game while the player
receives treatment. The precise effectiveness of the tactic, as
well as its frequency, might be assessed in future studies by
measuring the time of delay or the number of fouls awarded
the Benefit team. Future studies might also consider other time-
wasting tactics such as the goalkeeper deliberately holding the
ball, players leaving the field slowly during substitution, and
delaying the start of play when taking corners, free kicks and
throw ins.
Typically, the Benefit team player would go to ground
following contact with another player, including grimacing,
holding the injured area and signaling for assistance from the
bench. It is possible, therefore, that the player received a genuine
knock, which was then exaggerated. Thus, the player might
be accused of feigning the severity of the injury rather than
the entire injury. Future studies might further address that
distinction. Regardless of whether the player receives a knock
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or not, however, becoming more readily immobile requires an
explanation. One explanation is that immobilization brings a
benefit to the team.
It is known that people can and do change their behavior
according to the gains brought about by the changes. As others
have noted, financial benefit increases the likelihood of patients
being referred for tests, screening procedures or operations.
Cesarean section rates are higher when private practitioners,
paid per operation, provide the care for pregnant women
(Levitt and Dubner, 2005; Smith, 2006). Soccer players in a
winning team, or holding a draw against expectation, have
an incentive to stop play and maintain their position as the
game goes forward. Here we provide compelling evidence,
both behavioral and self-report, that one way this is achieved
is through the successful feigning of injury. We raise the
question of whether others might also successfully feign injury,
pain or disease when motivated to do so (Halligan et al.,
2003).
Prior studies have noted that sport can be used as a
vehicle for character development and to develop prosocial
behavior, especially amongst the young (Kavussanu, 2006).
The time-wasting behavior described here could be described
as unsportsmanlike and immoral, and something not to be
emulated by young people involved in sport. While we
recognize the potential merit in that position, we hesitate
to call feigning or exaggerating injury anything more than
negative. Professional soccer is not youth soccer. Whereas
youth soccer may involve character building, professional
soccer is not, on the whole, concerned with developing the
moral character of the players. Professional soccer is a highly
lucrative form of entertainment where the rewards for winning,
and the punishments for losing, can be staggering. Part of
the guiding morality of a professional soccer club includes
remaining financially viable, and winning ugly games supports
financial viability. Another part of the guiding morality of
a professional soccer club includes keeping the fans happy.
As fans of the game, we vent frustration when a player
from an opposing side engages in an obvious tactic to slow
the game and waste time. But we also recognize when our
own players do this that it is a beneficial tactic, which, as
demonstrated here, is recognized by players and managers as
“clever.” Fans are happy when their team wins, even if the win
is ugly.
CONCLUSIONS
Professional soccer players in a winning or beneficial draw
position increasingly show signs of mild injury as the game
draws to the end. This behavior, and their freely given comments,
suggest a deliberate strategy to feign injury for gain.
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